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CASE COMMENTARY
KIDNEY DONATION FROM MINORS AND INCOMPETENTS
Roger Stetter*
In the novel case of In re Richardson,' the Louisiana courts were
asked to sanction the donation of a kidney from a mongoloid child to
his critically ill sister. At the time suit was filed, Roy Richardson was
seventeen years old with the mental age of only a three or four-year-
old.' Roy's sister, Beverly, age thirty-two, was suffering from almost
total kidney failure complicated by severe high blood pressure and
internal bleeding. Her kidneys had steadily deteriorated to the point
where she needed to be placed on an artificial kidney machine, or to
receive a suitable donor organ from a living person;3 otherwise, Bev-
erly would certainly die within a matter of months.4 Although the
testimony of her transplant surgeon was not consistently clear on this
score, he stated that in Beverly's case the use of an artificial kidney
machine would be tremendously risky because of her severe high
blood pressure and tendency to bleed.' All of Beverly's siblings, ex-
cept an older brother who did not volunteer, and her mother and
father were tested to establish their suitability as kidney donors. Only
Roy's kidney matched perfectly with Beverly's.'
Roy's parents believed the transplant of one of his healthy kid-
neys to his sister Beverly would be in the boy's best interest because
Beverly was Roy's closest sibling and she would be the "logical"
person to care for him in the event of his parents' demise.7 Beverly
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 284 So. 2d 185 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 So. 2d 338 (La. 1973)
(Barham, J., dissenting). This is a case of first impression in Louisiana.
2. All of the following facts are as reflected in the transcript of testimony taken
before Judge Gerald P. Federoff, In re Roy Allen Richardson, No. 562-103 (Civ. Dist.
Ct., Parish of Orleans, Div. J., Sept. 28, 1973) (hereinafter cited as Transcript]. This
transcript is part of the record on file, In re Richardson, No. 6091 (La. App. 4th Cir.
Oct. 10, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Record].
3. Although Louisiana has enacted legislation patterned after the Uniform Ana-
tomical Gift Act, LA. R.S. 17:2351-59 (Supp. 1968), which greatly facilitates the pro-
curement of organs from cadavers, the testimony of Dr. John C. McDonald was that
due to the waiting list, Beverly could not get a cadaver transplant for four or five years.
Transcript at 73.
4. Transcript at 25, 42.
5. Id. at 48-52, 73-74.
6. Due to the human body's built-in rejection mechanism, the use of one of Roy's
kidneys in preference to one from another relative offered a significantly greater likeli-
hood that Beverly would be restored to a healthy life. Id. at 49-50, 53.
7. Id. at 14-15, 17-19.
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herself, after some soul-searching, agreed to accept one of Roy's kid-
neys.8 But the lack of precedent for using a donor who is mongoloid,
and the unknowable risk of incurring civil or possibly even criminal
liability, counseled legal precautions on the part of the surgeons and
a case was made to obtain the umbrella of a judicial decree.' Roy's
father filed suit against the child's mother to compel her to consent
to transplant surgery, 0 though in fact both parents favored the
operation," and the only issue was whether their consent was legal.
The appellate court, affirming the trial judge, found that the
removal of one of Roy's healthy kidneys for transplantation to his
sister would not be in his best interest, would solely benefit Beverly,
and would therefore be illegal.'" Significantly, both courts stated they
had authority to authorize the transplant of a minor's kidney with his
parents' consent if this were found to be in the minor's best interest.
In denying the requested authorization, the appellate court found
"highly unlikely" the postulated benefit to Roy in having a healthy
sister to care for him.' Given the serious nature of Beverly's underly-
ing disease, her medical history of dizzy spells, weakness and toxic
.psychosis, and the uncertainty as to how long she could live with a
successful transplant," as well as Roy's limited life expectancy of
8. Id. at 46.
9. Letter from Robert E. Lee, attorney for petitioner, to Roger Stetter, May 20,
1974, on file in offices of Louisiana Law Review.
10. The device of suing the undertutrix was explicitly recognized as a procedural
vehicle for getting the case into court. In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185, 186 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1973). Accordingly, no harm resulted from it not being evident upon the face
of the pleadings that both parents consented to the transplant. However, there appears
to be no reason why the doctors could not have brought a declaratory judgment against
Roy's parents to establish their own non-liability. The federal declaratory judgment
statute, upon which the Louisiana declaratory judgment act is patterned, allows pro-
spective defendants to sue to establish their non-liability. See Declaratory Judgment
Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1964); FED. R. Civ. P. 57; LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 1871-83.
11. "Consent For Donation of Kidney," Record at 12.
12. In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185, 187 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973). Judge Federoff
dictated his reasons for judgment into the record. See Transcript at 88.
13. 284 So. 2d at 187; Transcript at 88.
14. 284 So. 2d at 187.
15. Transcript at 32-39, 70-71. Beverly was afflicted with the disease known as
"Systemic Lupus Erythematosus." See 12 CYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE & SURGERY 398 A
(1970). She died on December 12, 1973 from damage to her brain, heart and kidneys
caused by this very complex disease, rather than from the failure to perform a kidney
transplant. Richardson was not a good test case because, even as the trial date ap-
proached, it became evident to the medical team that a transplant was infeasible due
to difficulties with Beverly's blood clotting, and that a transplant could not save her
life because the clinical evidence began to strongly suggest S.L.E. involving damage
to other organs, rather than the original diagnosis of kidney failure and hypertension.
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twenty-five years,'8 this eminently reasonable conclusion is not sur-
prising.
The court was also incapable of predicting the possible psycho-
logical detriment to Roy if Beverly should die. Roy's father's testi-
mony revealed that Roy had never experienced the death of a loved
one." Roy's own testimony also belied the assumption he would suffer
deep emotional trauma upon the death of his sister. Questioned by
defendant counsel as to whether he loved his sister Bev, Roy re-
sponded "yes." But in response to a previous question as to the names
he called his brothers and sisters, Roy responded "daddy.'
8
Bottomed on a faulty record, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal
erroneously assumed that Beverly could be maintained indefinitely
on an artificial kidney,'9 and pointed to the presence of other avail-
able sibling donors in support of its conclusion that kidney transplan-
tation, and in particular the use of Roy's kidney, was not an "absolute
medical necessity" to save Beverly's life. 0 Although the court thus
noted Beverly's less than urgent need for Roy's kidney, it remains
unclear from the opinion whether a finding of "absolute medical ne-
cessity" could tip the legal scales in a case in favor of authorizing a
transplant from a minor. Specifically, if Beverly had no other adult
siblings or parents who could spare her an organ, and if the record
clearly showed that she could not use an artificial kidney," would the
It was upon the basis of that original diagnosis that the kidney donor selection process
had been initiated and the court test conceived. Letter from Dr. Meyer Kaplan, Bev-
erly Richardson's personal physician and an expert in renal failure who testified at the
trial, to Roger Stetter, July 26, 1974, on file in offices of Louisiana Law Review.
16. In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185, 186 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
17. Transcript at 16.
18. Id. at 21-22.
19. Dr. McDonald, Roy's anticipated transplant surgeon, testified on direct exam-
ination that due to Beverly's severe high blood pressure and tendency to bleed it would
be unwise and risky to place her on an artificial kidney. Transcript at 48, 52. Later,
upon cross-examination, he was asked, "But, in all medical probability, Miss Richard-
son can be maintained on hemodialysis for five years?" He responded, "The chances
are fifty to one." Id. at 73-74. Dr. McDonald has informed the author that his testi-
mony in these particulars was confusing, but that his intent in responding to cross-
examiner was to give the life-chances for a hypothetical patient on dialysis, rather than
Beverly's chances, which were much more restricted. Letter from Dr. John C. McDon-
ald to Roger Stetter, May 24, 1974, on file in offices of Louisiana Law Review. Unfor-
tunately, this is not clear to one reading the transcript, and the Fourth Circuit cannot
be faulted for making an erroneous assumption. See Transcript at 74.
20. 284 So. 2d at 186-87.
21. As previously discussed, the trial testimony was less than clear on this very
crucial issue. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
An excellent article discussing the scarcity of artificial kidney machines and the
attendant problems of selecting candidates for such life saving treatment is Sanders
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court have permitted the use of Roy's kidney? The appellate court did
not even intimate what the answer would be. In contrast, it would
appear that the trial court explicitly viewed its task as more of a
balancing process, for the judge stated, "I suppose my job, in this
case, is to weigh the humanitarian factors of Beverly's needs against
the reasonable alternatives, other than Roy's being the donor, consid-
ering the positive factors that he may experience.""2
A survey of the existing jurisprudence will serve to clarify the
proper test to be used to determine under what circumstances a child
or incompetent may "donate" a healthy kidney to a relative. First,
it should be noted that the parents or other appropriate guardian
(hereafter "guardian") of a minor or incompetent (hereafter "ward")
have both the right and duty to consent to conventional medical or
surgical procedures which are intended to directly benefit the ward.2"
However, the right of a guardian to consent to medical or surgical
procedures which are non-therapeutic, that is, which do not have as
their primary aim the physical or psychological well-being of his
ward, is an entirely different question.
The courts confronted this problem in the early cases arising
from kidney transplants,24 a prime example of a non-therapeutic op-
eration. In 1956, surgeons were requested to perform life-saving kid-
ney transplant surgery on three pairs of identical twin children.25
& Dukeminier, Medical Advance and Legal Lag: Hemodialysis and Kidney
Transplantation, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rzv. 357 (1968). The authors estimate the cost per
patient to be as high as $28,000 a year. Id. at 362. However, these cost barriers to
hemodialysis are largely eliminated by the Social Security Act of 1972 which provides
disability insurance to any employee covered by Social Security, his spouse or depen-
dent child who needs hemodialysis or a kidney transplant. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 426(e)-
(g) (Supp. 1973).
22. Transcript at 82.
23. For example, in Owens v. State, 116 P. 345 (Okla. Crim. App. 1911), the father
of a child suffering from typhoid fever who refused to permit physicians to treat her
illness was convicted of a misdemeanor for wilfully failing to perform his duty to
furnish necessary medical care. See Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 1047 (1950); cf. Annot., 100
A.L.R.2d 483 (1965). There have been numerous cases finding children "neglected" or
"dependent" and depriving their parents of custody for their refusal to consent to
surgery or other appropriate medical treatment. See, e.g., People ex rel. Wallace v.
Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952). See Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 1138 (1953);
Farber v. Oklon, 254 P.2d 520 (Cal. 1953) (adult incompetent).
24. Actually, the first successful kidney transplant involved an adult identical
twin donor whose informed consent obviated legal hurdles. Curran, A Problem of
Consent: Kidney Transplantation in Minors, 34 N.Y.U. L. REv. 891, 892 (1959).
Compare Kusanovich, Medical Malpractice Liability and the Organ Transplant, 5 U.
SAN FRaN. L. REV. 223, 225-30 (1971) with Note, 20 STAN. L. REv. 99 (1967) (medical
licensure action against doctors who experimented upon elderly debilitated patients
without obtaining their informed consent).
25. At the time these cases were decided the expertise in the area of renal medi-
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Because of the absence of obvious therapeutic benefit to the healthy
minor donors, the surgical staffs brought declaratory judgment ac-
tions to establish their right to operate with the consent of the par-
ents.2"
In each of these three cases, the Massachusetts high court ap-
proved the donation of a kidney by the healthy twin to his sick sib-
ling. Upon the basis of psychiatric testimony that "grave emotional
impact" would result to the healthy twin if his sibling should die, the
court specifically found the operation was for the benefit of the
healthy twin as well as his sick brother or sister. Notwithstanding the
existence of parental consent, the court took special pains to satisfy
itself that the well twin understood and voluntarily chose to assume
the risk of giving up one of his kidneys.
The first reported case in the United States involving a kidney
donor who was not suijuris is Strunk v. Strunk.7 At the time of suit,
Jerry Strunk was a twenty-seven-year-old incompetent who had been
committed to a state institution for the feeble-minded." His older
brother Tommy was the victim of a fatal kidney disease who needed
a kidney transplant to survive much longer. All members of Tommy's
family were tested as prospective kidney donors but found unsuitable
with the exception of Jerry who was found to be an excellent match.
The hospital, acting on advice of counsel, refused to proceed with the
transplant upon the consent of Jerry's parents. Accordingly, Jerry's
mother, as his committee, petitioned the county court to authorize
her to consent. Based on the testimony of a psychiatrist that Jerry
cine was such that the sick twin would have died without the donation of a kidney from
his healthy sibling. The artificial kidney machine was not yet perfected. Sanders &
Dukeminier, supra note 21, at 360. Successful transplant surgery was limited to identi-
cal twins. See Wasmuth & Stewart, Medical and Legal Aspects of Human Organ
Transplantation, 14 CLv.-MAR. L. REv. 442, 443 (1965).
26. These cases, brought as original actions in the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, resulted in three unreported opinions which are discussed in Curran,
supra note 24. Savage also cites a 1960 unreported decision by the probate court for
the District of Darien, Connecticut authorizing a kidney transplant from an incompe-
tent to his sister, which the court found to be for the psychological benefit of the
incompetent. Savage, Organ Transplantation With an Incompetent Donor: Kentucky
Resolves the Dilemma of Strunk v. Strunk, 58 Ky. L.J. 129, 137 n.26 (1970). A 1973
unreported decision by the Georgia Superior Court permitted a 15-year-old retarded
girl to donate a kidney to her mother who suffered from chronic renal disease. Howard
v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 42 U.S.L.W. 2322 (Ga. Super. Ct., Nov. 29, 1973).
27. 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. App. 1969). See Annot., 35 A.L.R.3d 692 (1971). In re
Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973), is the third such reported case.
See also note 32 infra.
28. The detailed presentation of facts and lower court findings in the text is based
on Savage, Organ Transplantation With an Incompetent Donor: Kentucky Resolves
the Dilemma of Strunk v. Strunk, 58 Ky. L.J. 129 (1970).
1975]
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had some understanding of the situation and would be "saddened
more or less [by the death of his brother] in the same manner as
someone who had normal mentality," the testimony of the State
Department of Mental Health that Jerry's close ties with Tommy
were a vital part of his rehabilitation, and the poignant testimony of
Jerry's mother regarding Tommy's remarkable dedication to his men-
tally retarded brother,29 the trial court found that "it would be
psychologically beneficial and in the best interest of the incompe-
tent" to donate the kidney and the committee was authorized to
consent. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment by
a four to three majority on the basis of substantial evidence.
Strunk was the only case cited by counsel for petitioner in In re
Richardson,0 but was found factually distinguishable, especially re-
lative to the conclusion of "best interest" of the incompetent. While
both cases dispense with the requirement of informed consent of the
donor ward, they illustrate the importance of the ward's mental de-
velopment to a finding of best interest. Jerry Strunk, the equivalent
in mental age of a six-year-old, was incapable of giving his informed
consent, yet he did have some understanding of the procedure and a
desire to help his brother. Roy Richardson, with the mental age of a
three or four-year-old, did not. The persuasiveness of psychiatric tes-
timony relative to a finding of best interest is not very great where
the donor is of such low mental age, and the court may perfer its
common sense judgment over that of the psychiatrists." In such
cases, absent some uniquely beneficial relationship such as an
identical twin, or parent and child,32 the courts will probably con-
clude that the operation is not in the ward's best interest. Such a
29. Mrs. Strunk testified that after she and her husband were gone "the only
living person who will be there will be Tommy to go to the school and see about Jerry
and take him out and let him have a half-normal life and let him know what it is
outside the cold institution walls." Savage, supra note 28 at 144.
30. Brief for Petitioner, Record.
31. See Curran, supra note 24 at 893-95.
32. In a recent decision, the Superior Court of Connecticut upheld the right of
parents of identical twins, aged 7, to consent to transplantation of a kidney from one
twin to the other. The court found that the operation on the donee was necessary to
save her life, but in view of the twins' tender years characterized as of slight value
psychiatric testimony that if the expected success-results were achieved they would be
of immense benefit to the donor twin. While the court noted that the transplant would
be of some benefit to the donor, it emphasized the negligible risk to the donor, the life-
saving nature of the transplant, and the fact that the parents' motivation and reason-
ing had been favorably reviewed by the guardian ad litem for the donor (who also
conferred with the donor child), a clergyman and the court itself. Hart v. Brown, 29
Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386 (Super. Ct. 1972). See Howard v. Fulton-Dekalb Hosp.
Auth., 42 U.S.L.W. 2322 (Ga. Super. Ct., Nov. 29, 1973) (parent and child).
[Vol. 35
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uniquely beneficial relationship existed between Jerry and Tommy
Strunk but did not so clearly exist between Roy and Beverly Richard-
son. The finding of our court that Strunk was factually distinguisha-
ble relative to the conclusion of best interest of the incompetent thus
seems sound.
Strunk is also distinguishable in terms of the medical predica-
ment of the donee.3 It occupies a middle position between the Massa-
chusetts identical twin cases where death was imminent if the
healthy twin could not donate a kidney and In re Richardson where
less suitable donors were available and a cadaver transplant more
likely to suceed.3 ' Although the effect of Strunk is to liberalize the
donee's requirements before a transplant on a ward can be sanc-
tioned, the benefit to the donee must still be very substantial. While
this "very substantial" benefit to the donee test was probably
satisfied in Richardson, the case faltered for a lack of positive benefit
to the donor.
Thus, there first emerges from the kidney transplant cases the
uniform requirement that the guardian consent to the operation. This
is consistent with the general rule that a non-emergency operation
performed upon a minor without his parents' consent is legally a
battery,35 with the limited exception recognized in some cases that
minors who have reached the age of discretion may consent to
therapeutic operations.3 6 In the few reported cases where the courts
33. In Strunk, all other members of the family including distant relatives were
tested and found to be totally unsuitable donors; a cadaver transplant could be per-
formed, but with only about a forty per cent chance of success. Savage, supra note 28,
at 145.
34. In Richardson, there was a ninety-five percent chance of success using Roy's
kidney as compared to a seventy to eighty percent chance of success using one of
Beverly's other siblings. Transcript at 53. The chances of success using a cadaver when
one became available would be between fifty and sixty percent. Transcript at 67. See
also note 3 supra.
35. Compare Zoski v. Gaines, 271 Mich. 1, 3, 260 N.W. 99, 102 (1935) (father
recovered against surgeon who performed tonsillectomy on minor without parental
consent) with Wells v. McGehee, 39 So. 2d 196, 202 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1949) (emer-
gency excused physician's failure to obtain mother's consent before attempting to set
child's fractured arm).
36. In the first reported case recognizing this exception, involving the accidental
death from anesthetic of a mature 17-year-old boy who consented to the removal of a
tumor upon his left ear, a death action brought by his father, who knew nothing of
the attempted operation, was unsuccessful. The court stressed the maturity of the boy
and the acquiescence of other adult relatives who accompanied him to the surgeon's
office. Bakker v. Welsh, 108 N.W. 94 (1906). The same court upheld recovery where
the child was only 91/2 years old. Zoski v. Gaines, 271 Mich. 1, 260 N.W. 99 (1935).
More recently, the Ohio Supreme Court, after a thorough review of the authorities,
concluded that an intelligent 18-year-old girl who consented to plastic surgery to im-
1975]
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have faced squarely the question whether absent guardian approval
a minor's consent to a non-therapeutic operation shielded the physi-
cians from liability, the courts have held against the physicians. 7
The kidney transplant cases also make benefit to the donor a
cardinal requirement which must be proven in each case. This is in
harmony with the principle of shipwreck cases38 that, in the eyes of
the law, every human life is of equal value; therefore, the law can
never sanction human sacrifice intended to benefit some persons at
the expense of others. Dicta in earlier cases implied the right of a
'parent to consent to an operation which was of no conceivable benefit
to his child," presumably for the unstated reason that parents know
better than judges what is best for their children. But modern child
neglect cases demonstrate that a parent, regardless of his good faith,
is required to act in his child's best interest and is held strictly ac-
countable for his failure to do so. Contrary to the once held view that
only moral depravity could oust a parent of his guardianship," a
parent's "defective judgment," even in a non-critical case involving
the physical welfare of his child, whether it is based on ignorance,
prove the appearance of her nose was not entitled to recover against her surgeon for
assault and battery even though her parents' consent had not been secured. Lacey v.
Laird, 166 Ohio St. 12, 139 N.E.2d 25 (1956). However, it was explicitly recognized that
the court was not faced with a situation where the operation was not for the benefit of
the minor. Id. at 26, 139 N.E. 2d at 34 (Taft, J., concurring).
37. See Zaman v. Schultz, 19 Pa. D. & C. 309 (Cambria County Ct. 1933) (young
maidservant and her father recovered damages against a surgeon for taking blood
transfusions for the benefit of the girl's employer's wife without her father's consent).
The Zaman court correctly distinguished those cases excusing a physician's failure to
secure parental consent, by noting that, in each of them, the operation was for the
direct benefit of the child. Id. at 312. See also Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C.
Cir. 1941) (Surgeon liable for skin graft performed on minor for another's benefit).
38. See United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360 (No. 15,383) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842)
(seaman convicted of manslaughter for sacrificing passenger without opportunity to
draw lots). The pertinency of the shipwreck cases to the problems of kidney transplan-
tation is explored in Sanders & Dukeminier, supra note 21, at 374.
39. See Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Zaman v. Schultz, 19
Pa. D. & C. 309 (Cambria County Ct. 1933).
40. See In re Tuttendario, 21 Pa. Dist. 561 (Q.S. Phil. County, 1911). Petition was
filed by the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children to transfer custody of a
7-year-old boy afflicted with rickets. The child's mother, who had lost seven other
children, refused to consent to corrective surgery because she believed the child would
die. The medical testimony indicated the operation could be safely performed and that
without it the child's condition would grow progressively worse until he eventually
became permanently crippled. The court concluded it had no authority to override the
mother's refusal, even if it were based on an unreasonable apprehension of death
because, "As the law stands, the parents forfeit their natural right of guardianship only
in cases where they have shown their unfitness by reason of moral depravity." Id. at
563. Accord, In re Hudson, 126 P.2d 765 (Wash. 1942).
[Vol. 35
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fanaticism, or other arbitrary reasons, may now be made the basis of
a finding of neglect and the entry of an order transferring custody so
that the child will be afforded appropriate surgical or medical care.
Thus, in an early pathbreaking case4 a two-year-old child was found
to be "neglected" and her parents temporarily deprived of custody so
that she might undergo an operation for the removal of an eye which
was malignant with cancer. There was no element of cruelty in the
case, her mother simply testifying, "God gave her the baby and God
can do what he wants." More recently, New York's highest court
upheld an order permitting massive surgery to be performed to re-
move a grotesque tumor from the face and neck of a fifteen-year-old
boy, although the operation was quite dangerous and the boy's under-
lying disease posed no immediate threat to his life.2 The religious
convictions of the boy's mother, a Jehovah's Witness, against blood
transfusions, without which the surgery could not be undertaken,
were not felt to be a serious obstacle. 3 In light of this modern ap-
proach to child neglect cases the principle followed in the kidney
transplant cases requiring that any non-therapeutic operation must
be in the ward's best interest seems unassailable.44
The recent child neglect cases are also significant in that they
have focused consideration on the child's wishes as to whether to
undergo therapeutic surgery despite the resulting infringement on
41. In re Vasko, 238 App. Div. 128, 263 N.Y.S. 552 (2d Dept. 1933).
42. In re Sampson, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918 (1972), aff'g 317 N.Y.S.2d 641
(Fain. Ct. 1970).
43. The lower court in Sampson quoted from the famous case of Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944): "Parents may be free to become martyrs
themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in indentical circumstances, to make
martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion
when they can make that choice for themselves." In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641,
652 (Fam. Ct. 1970).
44. See generally, Morse, Legal Implications of Clinical Investigation, 8 WM. &
M AY L. REV. 359 (1967). The author predicts that the courts will probably regard
voluntary participation in medical experiments where the possibility of danger to life
or health is not remote as a privilege reserved only for adults. Id. at 368. In In re
Simpson, 180 N.E.2d 206 (Ohio Probate 1962), the court ordered sterilization of an
eighteen-year-old, feeble-minded girl upon application of the girl's mother. The court
stated in its opinion, however, that the operation was necessary for the health and
welfare of the girl. Id. at 208. Such a borderline case does not disprove the general
principle advanced in the text, although it does strain it to the limit. Cf. Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
It must be noted that the rationale of Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d
386 (Super. Ct. 1972), in which minimal risk to the child donor and parental judgments
were key considerations, may seem inconsistent with this writer's conclusion regarding
the best interest requirement. Consistent analysis indicates, however, that the
uniquely beneficial relationship which exists between identical twins achieves the
same result as the best interest requirement.
19751
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parental autonomy. Thus, in one case 5 a trial judge said he would
not hesitate to order corrective surgery on an intelligent twelve-year-
old boy for a cleft palate and harelip over the unreasonable beliefs of
his father in mental healing through "the forces of the universe," were
it not for the fact that the boy had been "conditioned" to dread
surgery. So that the boy could make his own decision, his father was
restrained from interfering in discussions with experts which would
acquaint the son with the benefits of surgery. It is believed that in
view of these precedents deferring to the wishes of an intelligent child
in the context of a non-critical therapeutic operation, no court would
order a ward to undergo surgery for the benefit of another contrary
to the ward's express wishes. Moreover, every court faced with a
request to allow non-therapeutic surgery on a ward will very likely
adopt the approach of the Massachusetts high court in the kidney
transplant cases, attempting where possible to ascertain his wishes.
The courts protect minors and incompetents from abuse in trans-
plant surgery primarily by erecting a legal safeguard against overzeal-
ous guardians and labelling it "best interest" of the ward. The bright
child who testifies in open court that he desires to donate his kidney
to his sick sibling may be the victim of "moral coercion," with the
not improbable result that the case gets railroaded through court
upon the basis of the parents' self-serving testimony that their chil-
dren enjoy the closest of ties. The role of the child psychologist is to
counteract such family pressure on the child to do the "right thing"
by ferreting out his true wishes and fears, thus enabling the court to
arrive at a correct solution. Given the small risk of harm attendant
upon the kidney transplant procedure, 46 a child's truly voluntary de-
cision to help his sibling should be deemed in his best interest be-
cause the intangible rewards of such a deed can be quite substantial.
In the case of the mentally incompetent donor, the best interest
safeguard serves to protect the donor against disfavored treatment
based on a low evaluation of his social worth. While it is undoubtedly
true that many parents will show the most tender regard for a men-
45. In re Seiferth, 127 N.Y.S.2d 63 (Child. Ct. 1954), rev'd, 285 App. Div. 221, 137
N.Y.S.2d 35 (4th Dep't 1955), rev'd and order of Children's Ct. reinstated, 309 N.Y.
80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955). See also In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972), review
after remand, 452 Pa. 373, 307 A.2d 279 (1973). Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
241 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (failure to canvass views of mature Amish child
who may wish to attend public high school against parents religious wishes violates
child's constitutional rights).
46. See statistical evidence in Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 148-49 (Ky. App.
1969). Of 3000 recorded kidney transplants from live donors, there is reported only one
death of a donor, and this death may have resulted from unrelated causes. See Hart
v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 373, 289 A.2d 386, 389 (Super. Ct. 1972).
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tally handicapped child, the tendency to judge an individual by his
contribution to society is too prevalent to rule out the possibility of
favortism being shown to the productive child. Since the mentally
incompetent donor may be incapable of experiencing the intangible
rewards of helping another, the role of psychiatric evidence will be
limited and the courts will have to base their determinations of best
interest on more objective criteria. The relevant inquiry should be
whether the prospective donee is likely to repay the incompetent
donor for the gift of life by helping to alleviate his plight. The surest
evidence upon which to base such a prediction of future benefit to the
donor is the concrete manifestations of love exhibited toward him in
the past. Such a test is neither unrelated to the goal of protecting the
donor nor is it unprecedented. 7
47. For the method of calculating monetary awards for mental anguish and loss
of society as elements of wrongful death damages, see Parker v. Smith, 147 So. 2d 407
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1962) ($20,000 award to husband for loss of wife's love and compan-
ionship held not excessive where husband and wife were practically inseparable during
their 40 years of marriage); Poindexter v. Service Cab Co., 161 So. 40 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1935) ($150 to husband for grief and loss of wife held sufficient where husband
contributed nothing to wife's support and was living in open adultery with another
woman).
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